






Abstract: Pragmatic modulation makes contextual information necessary for in-
terpretation. This poses a problem for homophonic reports and inter-contextual
communication in general: of co-situated interlocutors, we can expect some com-
mon ground, but non-co-situated interpreters lack access to the context of
utterance. Here I argue that we can nonetheless share modulated contents via
homophonic reports. First, occasion-unspecific information is often sufficient
for the recovery of modulated content. Second, interpreters can recover what
is said with different degrees of accuracy. Homophonic reports and
inter-contextual communication are often successful because the reporting con-
text does not demand full accuracy.
1. Introduction
It is a common practice to engage in a conversation and to later share what
we have learnt with further audiences. Here I will be concerned with those
cases in which something originally said in a context C1 is shared with a
different audience in context C2, via an indirect report or by a plain
assertion. These include, at least, the following kind of cases:
• Indirect reports. In particular, for reasons that will become clear later,
homophonic indirect reports. A homophonic indirect report1 is one in
which the reporter reports what is said by uttering the exact same
words as the original speaker. Imagine that Paula says ‘Marie has
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moved’. A homophonic indirect report would be ‘Paula said that
Marie has moved’.
• Assertions (or possibly other speech acts) that can be reconstructed as
indirect instances of indirect reports. An example might be useful.
Imagine the following conversation: ‘I met Paula this morning and
she told me about Marie. She has moved.’ I take it that ‘She has
moved’ is not, strictly speaking, an indirect report. However, it could
be reconstructed as one (‘Paula said that Marie has moved’).
• Assertions (or possibly other speech acts) in which the speaker shares
information obtained in a previous speech act with a new audience.
Going back to the previous example, this would be the case if the
reporter was to simply assert ‘Marie has moved’. Again, there is an in-
direct connection to a possible indirect report. If asked ‘How do you
know?’, the reporter could answer ‘I met Paula this morning and she
told me’.
All these cases can be counted as indirect reports, on a broad understanding
of report in which the locution ‘said that’ can be implicit or even optional.
Thus, we can speak of an original and a reporting context. Although this will
be mymain focus, the ideas presented here can be applied,mutatis mutandis,
to instances of inter-contextual communication, such as deliberations
involving a number of non-co-situated interlocutors over a period of time,
reading newspapers, and so forth. Thus, I take the discussion to shed light
on the phenomenon of sharing thoughts across contexts.
In order to report (in the broad sense, but also on amore restrictive sense),
speakers seem to use at least two strategies: they repeat the same sentence, or
they paraphrase what the speaker meant (or, better, what they take the
speaker to have meant). In this paper, I will only be concerned with the first
strategy. Using the terminology introduced so far, we can label the phenom-
enon I am interested in as ‘homophonic reporting’. Homophonic reports
play a central role in our practice of communicating across contexts. They
enable speakers to easily share content. Because of this, they constitute a
central piece in ordinary inter-contextual communication. However, it has
been argued (Cappelen and Lepore 2005) that this kind of report should
be inadequate if, as many philosophers hold, what gets communicated in
most verbal exchanges are contents that go beyond conventional meaning,
that is, modulated contents. My aim here is to argue that homophonic
reporting is compatible with the phenomenon of modulation. In order to
argue for this claim, I will, first, distinguish two varieties of contextual
information and explore how reporters exploit them, and, second, argue that
recovering a coarser grained version of the (originally) intended proposition
often secures inter-contextual communication and homophonic reports. The
standards governing reports are often low, and successful communication is
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amatter of recovering speaker meaning with the degree of accuracy required
by the goals of the conversation. The resulting view of communication is one
in which reporters take advantage of the background information shared by
non-co-situated interpreters and exploit the features of the reporting context.
Before going into details, let me present some background. According to
contextualism, what is said (i.e. the proposition expressed by a use of a
sentence) is often, or perhaps always, the result ofmodulation.2Modulation,
or pragmatic adjustment, is the process whereby the conventional meaning
of an expression gets modified in order to fit the specifics of the context of
use. The modulated or adjusted content includes contextual elements that
are not part of what the expression means. Here are three well-known
examples:
(1) I’m tired (Carston 2002).
The relevant degree of tiredness can vary from context to context. One
speaker can use (1) to communicate that she is too tired to go out for drinks,
whereas a different speaker can mean by the same sentence that she is too
tired to watch a movie at home. The conventional meaning of ‘tired’ is
enriched, thus expressing something more precise than what is encoded in
the expression.
(2) The leaves are green (Travis 1997).
The conventional meaning of the adjective ‘green’ simply refers to a color.
However, when this expression is used, its meaning can be made more
specific. Speakers can use (2) to talk about the original color of the leaves,
their observable color (imagine that the leaves are painted green), their color
on certain observation conditions, the color that the leaves exhibit on a
relevant part (perhaps only on a specific spot), and so forth. All these, let
us say, contextual meanings, are more specific than the conventional
meaning of ‘green’.
(3) Tipper is ready (Bach 1994).
The conventional meaning of this sentence does not specify what Tipper is
ready for. In conversation, it can be used to say that Tipper is ready for
dinner, ready for a job interview, ready to give a speech, and so forth.
Communication typically concerns modulated meaning. I will not provide
any new argument for this claim here, as I take it to be well established.3 Thus,
I will assume that conventionalmeaning very often falls short of speakermean-
ing and of the content retrieved by the interpreter in successful instances of
communication. Typically, if by (3) a speaker means, for example, that Tipper
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is ready for a job interview, the interpreter needs to retrieve this modulated
content for the exchange to be a successful instance of communication.4
Recovering only conventional meaning would most likely be insufficient.
The point that modulation is relevant for communication is quite uncon-
troversial. However, the problem arises when it comes to the recovery of
modulated content. Whenever the meaning of a sentence undergoes a
process of pragmatic adjustment, it seems that the interpreter needs to be
aware of the relevant contextual features and thus have recourse to different
kinds of knowledge, including plausibly knowledge about previous
discourse, information that can be obtained via perception, and knowledge
about the speaker. Because of this, Cappelen and Lepore (2005, pp.
123–124) claim that contextualismmakes communication, and in particular
inter-contextual communication, impossible. Of interlocutors situated in the
same context, we can expect some common ground, but things get
complicated when we move to inter-contextual communication. According
to these authors, a non-co-situated interpreter of an utterance (the interpreter
of a homophonic report), someonewithout access to the context of utterance,
lacks the information required to retrieve modulated content. Detractors of
contextualism, called minimalists, have tried to ground inter-contextual
communication on the transmission of conventional meaning rather than
modulated content.5 However, this is insufficient as an explanation of our
communicative practices, as it is difficult to deny that very often we share
modulated content, even across contexts.
In this article, I argue that we are often able to communicate across con-
texts via homophonic reports because the differences between reported and
reporting context are not as relevant to communication as it might first
appear. I will distinguish three scenarios. First, modulated content can be
recovered by having recourse to what I will call ‘occasion-unspecific infor-
mation’ (Section 3). Thus, the fact that the non-co-situated interpreter lacks
access to the original context of utterance is not relevant to the interpretation
of many homophonic reports. Second, occasion-specific information can
usually be made explicit, that is, the reporter can share relevant aspects of
the original context of utterance with non-co-situated audiences (Section 4).
Third, in inter-contextual communication interpreters often recover
impoverished contents, but these contents can be enough to secure
communication. Interpretation is gradual, and a high degree of accuracy is
not always required (Section 5).
2. The challenge
Letme start by insisting onwhat the problem is supposed to be. One strategy
that speakers seem to use in order to communicate across contexts is what I
have called homophonic reporting:
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Homophonic reporting: in order to inter-contextually share what is said
by an utterance of sentence S, the reporter repeats S.
Homophonic reporting covers those cases in which we share the informa-
tion obtained in a speech act simply by uttering the exact same words that
were originally uttered. Context-sensitivity can make homophonic reports
inappropriate. To see why, let us think of an overtly context-sensitive sen-
tence. Imagine Sandra uttering (4) in C1:
(4) I’m tired.
Regardless of the possible modulation of ‘tired’, the indexical
creates a problem. If Javier was to report homophonically, he would
utter (5):
(5) Sandra said that I’m tired.
But (5), uttered by Javier, is clearly inappropriate. It says that Sandra said
that Javier, not Sandra, is tired. Because modulation is a phenomenon of
contextual adjustment, the same should happen with instances of
modulation. Modulation should make homophonic reports inappropriate.
Moreover, modulation is pervasive. So homophonic reports should always,
or nearly always, be inappropriate. However, inmany cases, they seem to be
an appropriate device to share information. The problem is to explain how it
can be so.
A possible answer here is that homophonic reports do not really work.
Contextualists have argued against the idea that sharing content across
two non-identical contexts is always as easy as using the same
non-indexical sentence in both of them. Take indirect reports of the form
‘Speaker A said that p’, where p is the exact sentence that A originally
uttered. Recanati (2006), Travis (2006), and Wieland (2010b) have
argued that this kind of homophonic indirect report is often false.
Wieland imagines the following example. We have a barrel full of apples.
Some of the apples are affected by some fungus, and we need to discard
them. The fungus makes the interior of the apples red. Anne cuts an
apple and says (6):
(6) The apple is red.
Now imagine that the apple is left on the table. When Emma gets home,
she says that she is hungry and asks if that thing on the table is a red apple.
A report such as (7) would be incorrect here:
(7) Anne said that the apple is red.
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Given the new context, the plausible interpretation of ‘red’ is not affected
by some fungus but rather has red skin. The moral of this example is that
sharing linguistic meaning is not always enough for same-saying.
I think, however, that this is not the whole story. Although it is certainly
true that homophonic reports do not always work, there seem to be cases
in which this strategy can be successfully used. My aim is to explain why,
that is, in virtue of what (some) homophonic reports of modulated content
are successful. Cappelen and Lepore (2006) provide a convincing example
of a successful report:
(8) Dick Cheney and several other members of the Bush administration
knew that Saddam Hussein posed no serious threat to the United
States.
(8) is a quote from an interview with John Kerry on National Public
Radio in 2004. Cappelen and Lepore (2006) hold that we can understand
what Kerry said simply by reading (8) and that we can share it by repeating
the sentence, that is, with a homophonic report. I think this sounds plausible.
Imagine that Niamh and Claire have been discussing about the Bush admin-
istration. One of the sentences that Niamh has uttered is (8). Claire wants
now to share with Theresa what she has learnt. One way in which she could
do that is by uttering (8). However, some of the expressions in the sentence,
including notably ‘knew’, have been thought to be context sensitive. Accord-
ing to contextualists about knowledge,6 whether an utterance of a sentence
of the form ‘S knows that p’ is true partly depends on what is at stake, on
how demanding standards for knowledge are. These can shift from context
to context. Having access only to the linguistic meaning of (8), Theresa
should be unable to grasp the modulated meaning of the sentence – or so
the thought goes.
Here is another example:
(9) Napoleon was an interesting character.
About this sentence and a particular use of it by Cappelen, Cappelen and
Lepore write:
Call this the Napoleon Speech Act. We think the following is obviously true: Other people in
other contexts have said, could have said, and will say exactly what Cappelen said with the
Napoleon Speech Act. This would be miraculous if RC [Radical Contextualism] were true.
Those features which supposedly are constitutive of the content of (the what is said by) the
Napoleon-Utterance are not shared by other contexts of utterance. The only way for it to be true
that others have said whatwas said by theNapoleon-Utterance is if the specifics of the context of
utterance are irrelevant to content determination. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005, p. 127)
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I take home the following point. Imagine now Niamh uttering (9) as part
of a conversation with Claire. According to the contextualist, the
proposition expressed by Niamh’s utterance will be the result of a process
of modulation. In particular, who counts as an ‘interesting character’ is
something that can shift across contexts, with some contexts being more
demanding than others. A very simplistic contextualist theory for this
expression could go as follows. In context, a threshold for the property of
being interesting is determined. Whether or not Napoleon satisfies the
expression ‘interesting’ depends on whether or not he is above the threshold.
Presumably, the threshold will shift across contexts, thus giving rise to differ-
ent understandings of (9). Alternatively, we can say that ‘interesting charac-
ter’ is enriched in different ways (interesting character when compared to
ordinary people, interesting character for Spy fiction, etc.). But now imagine
that Claire wants to share with Theresa, who knows nothing about the
original context of utterance, Niamh’s opinions. It seems that one way in
which she can do that is with a homophonic report of (9).
Cappelen and Lepore’s discussion is framed in terms of same-saying. This
expression can be misleading. Minimalists about same-saying as Cappelen
and Lepore hold that sameness of conventional meaning is enough for
same-saying, in absence of classical indexicals. By contrast, contextualists
use ‘say’ and related expressions (‘what is said’) to refer to modulated
content. However, instead of focusing on same-saying, I will focus on
interpretation. The reason for this shift in perspective is that I am concerned
here with communication. Ultimately, what matters to communication is
that the interpreter retrieves the proposition intended by the speaker or a
proposition related to it.7 What I am interested in, and what is problematic
for modulation, is how can the interpreter access modulated content. Thus
viewed, Cappelen and Lepore’s point raises a question about how can an in-
terpreter grasp the modulated content of the original utterances of (8) and
(9) in absence of knowledge of the original context. Cappelen and Lepore’s
line of reasoning highlights the fact that we often understand repetitions of
sentences that have been originally uttered in contexts we know nothing,
or little, about (i.e. we often understand homophonic reports). Here is the
challenge. At least in some cases, it seems that the only thing we need to
do in order to communicate across contexts is to use the same
non-indexical sentence in both of them, that is, to repeat the sentence. But
assuming that the content that is shared is not identical to the conventional
meaning of the sentence uttered (i.e. that what we share is modulated con-
tent), how can the non-co-situated interpreters come up with the intended
interpretation?
Note that the possibility to communicate across two different contexts C1
and C2 by using the same sentence is not a problem in case the contextual
features relevant for modulation are kept identical in C1 and C2. This can
happen by coincidence, and it should be expected that speakers exploit the
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coincidence. Imagine that Niamh tells Claire during lunch ‘It will rain on
Saturday’. Later, Claire says to her neighbor Theresa ‘A friend told me that
it will rain on Saturday’. As many philosophers have argued, ‘It will rain on
Saturday’ can be used to talk about a variety of places (the place where the
conversation takes place or any other contextually salient place).8 However,
because both conversations take place in the same city, and assuming that
both concern that city, there is no reasonwhy ‘It will rain on Saturday’ could
not express the same content in them.
3. Occasion-unspecific information
What enables us to correctly interpret a homophonic report? How is it
that quite often non-co-situated interpreters are able to retrieve a content
that goes beyond conventional meaning? The first part of the answer is that,
despite not sharing a full context, original speaker and non-co-situated
interpreter typically share some background information. Homophonic re-
ports are inter-contextual in the sense that the interpreter of the report is
not co-situated with the original speaker and thus has no direct access to
the reported utterance. However, this is compatible with there being some
overlap between reported and reporting context.
The term ‘context’ is often loosely used. It refers to the conversational set-
ting and what is common ground in it. But this includes several different
types of information. At least, it includes the current state of the conversa-
tion, the physical setting, mutual knowledge about what is relevant, and
broader common knowledge.9 It can be useful to distinguish two types
of contextual information: occasion-specific and occasion-unspecific
information. Occasion-specific information includes the current state of
the conversation, information about physical setting, andmutual knowledge
about what is salient or relevant in the conversational setting.
Occasion-unspecific information includes background information or
common knowledge that can be used in the process of interpreting speech
but that is not specifically tied to the conversation. This second type of
information is often shared across contexts and exploited by reporters.
Underestimating this fact might obscure our reporting practices.
Occasion-unspecific information includes factual and metalinguistic
information. By factual information I mean information about the world,
for instance, about historical events. This information is plausibly playing
a key role in our interpretation of (8). The reason why we are able to under-
stand what Kerry said (beyond conventional meaning) is that we share a
great deal of knowledge with his interlocutors. In particular, this can be used
to explain an inter-contextual interpretation of the context-sensitive term
‘know’ in (8). We, non-co-situated interpreters, know that Bush went to
war in Iraq, that the justification for that war was the alleged existence of
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weapons of mass destruction in that country, and so forth. It is clear that,
when talking about a war declaration, knowledge standards are high.
Hence, we can infer a pragmatically adjusted meaning for ‘know’, just as a
co-situated interpreter would do.
Metalinguistic information includes information about which interpreta-
tions are more frequent. Suppose that most of the time the expression ‘red’
is used to describe an apple it refers to the color of its skin, that is, to certain
varieties of apples. People familiar with this statistical knowledge will
plausibly think that the stereotypical conversation in which the expression
‘red apple’ is used is one where ‘red’ described the apple’s skin, and use this
information to interpret an out of the blue utterance of the sentence ‘I’ve
bought some red apples’. Similarly, they can use their knowledge about
the most frequent sense of ‘red’ when combined with ‘apple’ in order to
interpret reports of the form ‘Paul said that the he had bought red apples’.
These interpretations based on likelihood can be called ‘interpretations by
default’.10 When we interpret by default we trust that the present use will
be aligned with (most) past uses.11 This explains why we have no problem
with reports of utterances of (9), even assuming that ‘interesting’ is
pragmatically adjusted. First thing to note, and not a case of modulation,
is that an interpreter must identify who the name ‘Napoleon’ refers to. Here
I will assume that the utterance is about Napoleon I because it is more
frequent to find references to him than to Napoleon II or Napoleon III. In
doing so, I interpret by default. Once I have identified a bearer, I move to
the modulation of ‘interesting character’; I can reason as follows. Napoleon
is a historical character. Usually, historical characters are compared with
other historical characters. The threshold for ‘interesting’ can be taken to
be higher than it is in conversations about, let us say, work colleagues. So
I assume that the threshold here is as high as in other conversations about
historical characters. Although I might not be able to come up with a very
definite sense of ‘interesting’, I can roughly interpret that ‘interesting charac-
ter’ means here something along the lines of interesting for a military leader
and/or emperor.
Two clarifications are in order. First, it is worth noting that the reporter
has here an active role. When a cooperative reporter decides to repeat the
sentence that was uttered in the reported context, she does so on the
(implicit, unconscious) assumption that the interpreter has the means to
grasp the intended interpretation. In this sense, she is not simply
repeating, she is choosing to repeat rather than to paraphrase.12 Second,
interpretations by default, as well as interpretations based on general factual
knowledge, are fallible.13 Interpreting by default often enables us to get at
the intended interpretation and thus can be considered a reliable strategy.
However, it sometimes fails. Although we typically use the expression ‘red
apple’ to refer to apples with red skin, there are conversations in which it
can be used to talk about rotten apples (apples that are red in the inside, refer
HOMOPHONIC REPORTS AND GRADUAL COMMUNICATION 9
© 2021 The Authors
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly published by University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
to the example in Section 1). This should come as no surprise. In the process
of interpretation, interpreters have recourse to the information that is
available to them and use it in order to modulate the conventional meaning
of the sentence used. However, in some cases, the available information
might be insufficient for them to guess what the speaker meant. In
interpreting a homophonic report, the interpreter lacks information about
the conversational setting. In some cases, this occasion-specific information
would override an otherwise adequate interpretation by default.
I will finish with a possible objection. It could be argued that, given that
occasion-unspecific information is shared and occasion-unspecific informa-
tion can be counted as contextual information (as part of the common
ground), the examples I have discussed are not really instances of
inter-contextual communication. We understand utterances of (8) and (9)
because we do share a context with the utterer. Although how to individuate
contexts is admittedly a difficult question, I think that one should resist this
notion of inter-contextuality. The reason is that it is too restrictive. On this
notion, few reports would count as properly inter-contextual, for we almost
always share some background and use it in interpretation. Here is an
example that would be ruled out. Imagine that I borrow a coat from a friend
and find in a pocket a piece of paper that seems to be a shopping list with
some items crossed out. On it, I read ‘red apples’ and come to think that
my friend has bought red-skin apples. Intuitively, this is a case of
inter-contextual interpretation. However, I plausibly share with whoever
wrote the list knowledge about the most common use of ‘red apple’.
4. Explicit occasion-specific information
In the previous section, I considered those cases in which the intended mod-
ulated content can be recovered by using occasion-unspecific information. I
move now to scenarios where occasion-specific information is necessary for
interpretation. First thing to ask is: is dependence on occasion-specific
information a problem for homophonic reporting? A positive answer seems
reasonable: non-co-situated interpreters lack occasion-specific information
and so should be unable to grasp homophonic reports of occasion-specific
modulated content. However, I will argue that dependence on
occasion-specific information is not always a problem. I distinguish two
kinds of scenarios. First, there are cases where the reporter can make explicit
the required occasion-specific information. These are the topic of this
section. Second, there are conversations where the common ground between
interlocutors includes a great deal of occasion-specific information relevant
for interpretation. In these cases, the reporter might not be in a position to
make everything explicit. I leave this second kind of cases for the next
section.
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Reporters ordinarily provide the background against which to interpret
reports. For example, they can make the topic of the original conversation
explicit. Imagine that (2) is used by a botanist working on a study on
chlorophyll during a conversation with her colleagues.14 In order to report
the utterance to a new audience, I can say something like ‘The botanists were
discussing about their study on chlorophyll. They needed more leaves. One
of them said that the leaves (on the tree in the yard) are green’. Thus, I add
an additional sentence that makes the occasion-specific information explicit.
This added sentence provides the contextual information required to
interpret the report. My point here is that, at least in some cases, small bits
of linguistically articulated contextual information is all that is needed to re-
cover the modulated content intended by the speaker.
It can be tempting to think of modulated content as something very
specific, and indeed it can be so in some cases (this is the topic of the next
section). For those cases, making explicit all the contextual information
necessary to retrieve what the speaker means can be a difficult task, because
of practical reasons. However, we should not suppose that this is what typ-
ically occurs. We can image Tipper’s friends chatting about Tipper’s bad
performance on her last job interview. Discussing about a new interview
she is having, one of them utters (3). We can take it that he means that
Tipper is ready for the job interview, in the sense of having thought the
answers that she will provide to some prototypical questions. But none of
the interlocutors needs to entertain a very precise sense of exactly which
questions she needs to be ready for in order to count as ‘ready’ in that
conversational context.15 A reporter could make the relevant contextual in-
formation explicit by saying ‘Tipper has another job interview. She has been
thinking about HR’s questions’. In general, neither the speaker’s communi-
cative intentions nor the output of the audience’s interpretation needs to be
very fine grained. An enriched content such as Tipper is ready for the job
interview might exhaust intentions and interpretation. Of course, there will
be contexts in which (2) and (3) can express very specific contents. However,
very specific contents are not always the case.
5. Communication as a gradual phenomenon
In the previous sections I have presented two kind of cases in which we can
share modulated content across contexts through a homophonic report:
cases in which the interpreter can recover the modulated content by having
recourse to occasion-unspecific information and those in which the
occasion-specific information required is made explicit. Here I move to a
third scenario: cases in which having access to rich occasion-specific infor-
mation is necessary in order to retrieve the intended proposition, but where
the interpreter lacks access to the whole range of details that were common
HOMOPHONIC REPORTS AND GRADUAL COMMUNICATION 11
© 2021 The Authors
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly published by University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
ground in the original exchange. I will argue that homophonic reporting can
be adequate in these cases as well, although it not always is. The idea is the
following. When the interpreter has an impoverished representation of the
context of utterance, the output of her interpretation is also an impoverished
version of what the speaker means. But this is a common phenomenon and
does not preclude communicative success. As Relevance Theorists have
argued,16 ordinary communication should not be seen as a perfect transmis-
sion of thoughts. In particular, my aim is to argue that interpreters (either
co-situated or non-co-situated) often recover a content that is less specific
than the content intended by the speaker. In this sense, interpretation is
gradual. Whether the impoverished version of the intended proposition is
enough for communication to be successful depends on what is at stake at
the conversational context. Something similar can be said about homopho-
nic reports. In an indirect report, the reporter plays with two contexts at
once. The aim is to make accessible to a new audience those aspects of the
reported utterance that are relevant in the reporting context. But not every
aspect needs to be relevant. As a result, an impoverished content can be
adequate given the purposes of the reporting context.
Let me first present the claim that interpretation is gradual in
intra-contextual communication. The phenomenon I would like to draw
attention to is that of conversations in which the interlocutors attain differ-
ent, let us say, levels of understanding of a given utterance. By this, I mean
cases in which one interpreter reaches a deep understanding of what the
speaker means, whereas the understanding of another interpreter is more
superficial, or cases in which the interpreter does not reach a completely
accurate representation of the proposition the speaker intends to communi-
cate. The situation is quite ordinary. As a first approach, think of
implicatures. Imagine that we are discussing about where to go for lunch. I
look through the window and say ‘It’s sunny’. With this information, most
interpreterswill probably interpretme as suggesting that we go out for lunch.
Now imagine that we have been talking about our favorite cafés in town and
you have told me about a very nice place with outdoor seating and that you
like to go there when it’s sunny. Imagine, further, that I have asked you to
take me there some time.With this additional information, you would prob-
ably take it that I mean something like ‘Let’s go to the place you mentioned
earlier’. The same happens with modulation. When two interlocutors know
each other well, and are aware of the topic of the conversation, and so on,
then their understanding of each other’s utterances can be very deep. By
contrast, in cases where an interpreter has only broadly grasped what the
conversation is about, or has little information about the speaker, her under-
standing of the utterance will be more superficial. The more information an
interpreter has, the more accurate her interpretation is.
Let us consider an example involving again the term ‘green’. Imagine that
Pia has a tree with brown leaves. She receives a phone call from a botanist
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who tells her ‘I need green leaves’. If Pia knows nothing or too little about
the person calling, she will have a rough understanding according to which
she wants leaves with a certain color (leaves that are green in some sense
or other). If she knows that this person is a botanist, she will interpret her
utterance as concerning natural properties only. And if she knows that the
botanist is working, let us say, on a research about chlorophyll, her under-
standing will be deeper. For example, she will exclude not only painted
leaves but also leaves that are green by the effect of something other than
chlorophyll (microorganisms, mold, etc.). In the first two cases, the
proposition retrieved by Pia is less specific than the one retrieved by, for ex-
ample, the botanist’s colleagues. We can reflect this phenomenon by
representing the output of their interpretations with propositions of different
granularities. Propositions can be more of less fine-grained, depending on
how specific the properties or concepts involved, the building blocks of the
proposition, are, for example, the property naturally green is more specific
than green and less specific than naturally green because of the presence of
chlorophyll. Being naturally green because of the presence of chlorophyll is
a way of being naturally green, which, in turn, is a way of being green.
Interestingly, there can be cases of successful communication even though
the proposition recovered by the audience is coarser grained than the
proposition intended by the speaker. Imagine that when Pia receives the
botanist’s call the leaves on her tree are brown. In this setting, a
coarse-grained proposition such as that the person calling needs leaves that
are green in some sense or other would be good enough for Pia to provide
an adequate answer, something like ‘Sorry, the leaves onmy tree are brown’,
even if the botanist has something more specific in mind (for example,
naturally green leaves). One could dispute that this is a successful instance
of communication on the basis that there is no unique proposition shared
by Pia and the botanist. I will go back to this point and show that
pluripropositionalism can help us understand what is shared between
speaker and hearer, but for themoment, let me note that the exchange would
count as successful on ordinary standards. The botanist wants to get
something (certain kind of leaves). She tells Pia. Pia gives her answer, and
as a result of the linguistic exchange, the botanist acquires the information
that she cannot get what she needs from Pia, which is correct.
Here is a second example. Imagine Sandra coming home after work on a
Friday night and her two flat mates chatting about what to do. Andrew
suggests that they go to the movies, to which Sandra replies ‘I’m tired’.
Sandra is actually exhausted and means that she is too tired to do anything
other than going to bed, thus excluding not only going to the movies but also
watching a movie at home, and so forth. However, because of the previous
conversation, Andrew interprets that Sandra is too tired to go to the movies
and decides to go on his own. François, by contrast, knows that Sandra
has been through a difficult week at work and is well aware that she is
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exhausted, and so grasps the finer grained proposition that Sandra intended.
Again, even if Sandra intended a more precise content than that Sandra is
too tired to go to the movies, and even though this content was recoverable
to some interlocutors (François did recover it), we can consider her exchange
with Andrew successful, given the purposes of the conversation. Andrew
wanted to know if Sandra was up to go to the movies, and his interpretation
of Sandra’s utterance was good enough for that. He just happened to
recover, on the basis of the sentence expressed together with some contextual
information (previous discourse, in this case), a coarser grained proposition
than the one intended by Sandra. Note also that in the two examples pre-
sented communication is not successful by luck. Both interpreters recover
a proposition that is related to the one intended by the speaker. It is an
impoverished version of it.
Together with these, there are of course cases in which a coarser grained
version of the intended proposition is insufficient to ground communication.
Imagine now that Pia is decorating her garden and has painted the leaves on
her tree green. She receives a call from the botanist and, not being aware that
the botanist will use the leaves for a scientific study, she retrieves the propo-
sition that the person calling needs leaves that are green in some sense or other.
Here it seems that the impoverished content will lead to a misunderstanding.
According to her interpretation, the leaves on her tree count as what the bot-
anist wants, but, according to the botanist’s intended meaning, they do not.
As a general rule, we can say that impoverished contents are admissible
when they are conducive to the goals of the conversation. An interpretation
is goal-conducive when the information it provides can be fruitfully used as
part of a plan to achieve the goal at stake, that is, when it does not mislead
the interpreter in the achievement of the goals. These can be practical,
extralinguistic goals (getting leaves), but also more theoretical goals, as
happens when the whole point of the conversation is to share information
or discuss about a topic with no envisaged practical application. If the inter-
preter retrieves a coarser grained version of the proposition intended by the
speaker, and this coarse-grained proposition is informative enough for the
achievement of the goal at stake in the conversation, then the exchange
can be counted as successful.
The examples discussed are instances of the phenomenon of free
enrichment, i.e., a pragmatic process whereby the meaning of an expression
is rendered more specific. Let me say a bit more about successful
communication for conversations in which meaning is enriched. I hold that
it is a necessary condition for communication that the proposition recovered
by the interpreter is suitably related (not necessarily identical) to the
proposition intended by the speaker. What do I mean by ‘suitably related’?
In cases of enrichment, we can think of nested propositions. Conventional
meaning determines a proposition p1. p1 can be enriched, thus giving rise
to the enriched proposition p2. A way of thinking about the relation between
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p1 and p2 is to see p1 as included in p2. In this sense, they are nested. p2 could
in turn be further enriched. Informally,
Conventional meaning: p1.
Enrichment 1 (p2): <enriched p1>.
Enrichment 2 (p3): <enriched p2>, that is, <enriched
<enriched p1>>.
This can be used to represent the propositions used in the examples
discussed. For example,
(p1) Pia’s leaves are green.
(p2) Pia’s leaves are naturally green.
(p3) Pia’s leaves are naturally green because of the presence of
chlorophyll.
All three propositions can be intended by a speaker who utters the
sentence ‘Pia’s leaves are green’. p1 captures the conventional meaning of
the sentence, whereas p2 and p3 express enriched propositions. p3 is finer
grained than p2 and p1. Similarly,
(p4) Sandra is tired.
(p5) Sandra is too tired to go to the movies.
(p6) Sandra is too tired to do anything other than going to bed.
(= Sandra is too tired to go to the movies, watch a movie at home, go
out for dinner, read a novel, etc.).
p3 entails p2 and p1, and p6 entails p5 and p4. If we think of the content of
these propositions in terms of possible worlds, we can say that the set of
worlds that make p3 true is a subset of the set of worlds that makes p2 true,
and so forth. The proposition recovered by the interpreter is suitably related
to the one intended by the speaker when it is included in it. Being included in
it, it is entailed by it.17
Recovering a suitably related proposition is a necessary but not sufficient
condition. Given an utterance, whether recovering a suitably related proposi-
tion pwarrants communication will depend on the goals of the conversation.
Going back to a previous example, both p4 and p5 are suitably related to the
proposition intended by Sandra (viz. p6). Now, the point of the conversation
is to decide what to do and, in particular, to decide whether or not to go to the
movies together. To this aim, p4 is not informative enough. This proposition
is both compatible with Sandra being too tired to go to the movies and with
Sandra being too tired to work and not too tired to go to the movies. The
granularity threshold is set by the goals of the conversation.18
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What about inter-contextual communication? It often happens that, when
an utterance is shared with a non-co-situated interpreter, some fidelity is lost.
Imagine John and Laura chatting about Tipper’s bad performance in her
last job interview and the kind of things she must be ready for. Later, John
reports ‘Tipper has another interview tomorrow. Laura said that she is
ready’, addressing Jake, who was not present during the conversation. The
property intended by Laura could have been a very specific one. However,
on the basis of the indirect report, the non-co-situated interpreter will
probably not be able to get at it. Rather, Jake’s interpretation should be con-
ceived as a coarser grained proposition. Something like that Tipper is ready
for the job interview. As with the previous examples, this can be a case of
successful communication. For the purposes of John and Jake’s conversa-
tion, it can be enough to convey that Tipper is ready for the interview and
not something as precise as what Laura meant. Perhaps Jake just wants to
get a rough idea about how Tipper is doing.
So far, I have spoken of gradual interpretation. I think that, because inter-
pretation is gradual, and therefore, the proposition intended by the speaker
can be recovered with different degrees of accuracy, communication itself
should be regarded as a gradual phenomenon. Rather than thinking of
successful communication as the transmission of a unique proposition (the
intended proposition), we should see it as a matter of recovering speaker
meaning with the degree of accuracy required for the goals of the conversa-
tion. In the case of homophonic reports, the degree of accuracy is set by
whatever is at stake at the reporting context. Reporting contexts can be less
demanding than the original context of utterance, and so impoverished (or
coarser grained) versions of the intended proposition can be admissible.
At this point, one could wonder whether there is any difference between
this proposal and a minimalist approach according to which what is shared
in inter-contextual communication is a minimal proposition, that is, a
non-modulated content, as Cappelen and Lepore hold. There certainly is a
common point. The minimal content of an utterance can be considered an
impoverished version of the (modulated) proposition intended by the
speaker. My proposal leaves room for cases in which sharing a minimal
proposition is sufficient for communication. However, minimal content is
not the only impoverished content. We need to explain those cases in which
cross-contextual communication requires the sharing of a modulated con-
tent. The examples presented suggest that there is a range of contents with
different granularities that can be shared, with the granularity required being
relative to the conversational goals. In some cases, we need to go beyond
minimal content.
Interestingly, this analysis can be seen as a similarity view, but also as a
form of pluripropositionalism.19,20 Rather than representing an act of com-
munication as involving only one intended and one recovered proposition,
we can represent the content of an utterance as a plurality of propositions,
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ranging from the minimal content of the sentence uttered (conventional
meaning plus referents of indexicals) to the modulated meaning intended
by the speaker. In between, there might be a plurality of propositions with
different granularities. When a speaker utters, for example, (1), the content
of her speech act includes, at least, a proposition corresponding to the min-
imal content of her utterance and a modulated proposition and, possibly
other in-between propositions (p5 and p6, for instance). Thus viewed, the
idea that communication is gradual is compatible with there being shared
content – although it might not be the finest grained proposition, there is a
proposition that is shared between speaker and hearer.
What about the content of homophonic indirect reports? A homophonic
indirect report is true if and only if it attributes to the speaker at least one
of the propositions that she expressed in the reported utterance (and does
not, on top of that, attribute any proposition that was not expressed in the
reported utterance).21 Following the pluripropositionalist perspective, we
can say that the report picks a subset of the propositions expressed in the
reported context. This subset might include only one proposition, but we
should not rule out the possibility that more than one proposition is
transmitted.Which proposition(s) the reporter manages to transmit depends
on what is available in the reporting context. As contextualists have noted
(refer to Section 2), reporting contexts in which the topic under discussion
is radically different from the topic of the reported context lead to the misin-
terpretation of the homophonic indirect report.22 In order for the reporter to
successfully share content via a homophonic report, the reporting context
must be similar enough to the reported context or otherwise contain enough
clues about how to interpret the report – perhaps the previous discourse con-
tains information about the reported context, perhaps the reporter herself
makes some occasion-specific information explicit. Moreover, it can be
the case that some impoverished contents are not conducive to the goal of
the reporting context. Some impoverished contents, and in particular the
minimal proposition, might be too unspecific. For the report to be adequate,
it must not only be true but also transmit a proposition that is
goal-conducive in the reporting context, that is, it must capture what the
non-co-situated speaker said with the precision required for the new context.
It seems reasonable to hold that this is what cooperative reporters typically
do.When we report via a homophonic report, we do that on the assumption
that our audience has enough clues to grasp the reported utterance with the
accuracy required for the purposes of our conversation. In the kind of cases
of successful communication described above, those in which an
impoverished content is transmitted across contexts, the report picks at least
one of the propositions expressed by the reported utterance. This
proposition(s) is (are) not the finest grained one, but something in between
it and minimal content, and is goal conducive in the reporting context.
Pluripropositionalism can accommodate the fact that very often,
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fine-grained propositions are difficult to share via homophonic reports with
the possibility that many homophonic reports are nonetheless true and
adequate.
6. Conclusions
Cappelen and Lepore write:
Contemporary philosophy of language has to a large extent lost sight of some fundamental facts
about how we communicate across contexts. We can communicate and understand each other
despite an overwhelming range of differences (in perceptual inputs, interests, cognitive process-
ing, background assumptions, conversational contexts, goals, sense of relevance, etc.). This fact
should be at the forefront of any reflection about communication, but it has not been. (Cappelen
and Lepore 2006, p. 1021).
I have argued that speakers can communicate modulated contents across
contexts via homophonic reports. The reason is that, contrary to what
Cappelen and Lepore seem to assume, the ‘overwhelming range of
differences’ between contexts is not always relevant. I have distinguished
three kinds of cases. First, occasion-unspecific information, shared by non-
co-situated interpreters, can be sufficient to retrieve modulated content.
Second, reporters are sometimes (perhaps often) able to make the relevant
contextual information explicit, that is, to provide some context for the
homophonic report. Third, impoverished versions of the intended
proposition can be good enough in the reporting context. This explains
why homophonic reports of modulated content are often adequate.
Together with this, homophonic reports sometimes result in misunderstand-
ings. The interpreter of ‘Anne said that the apples are red’ can of course fail
to see that Anne meant that the apples are red in the inside (rotten).
In the view of communication that I advocate, communication is gradual
– the perfect transmission of a single proposition is not necessary for the suc-
cess of a linguistic exchange. I have put forward a specific proposal
unpacking the intuitive claim that interpreters often recover impoverished
contents. According to this proposal, which can be seen as a form of
pluripropositionalism, a coarser grained version of the proposition intended
by the speaker can ground communication, provided that it serves the
purposes of the conversation. In inter-contextual communication, this is
often the case. I have argued that this explains the usefulness of homophonic
reports. Having limited access to the original context, the interpreter of a
homophonic report might fail to grasp speaker meaning in all its depth.
However, her interpretation might very well serve the purposes of the
reporting context. Also, I have argued that reporters very often exploit
similarities across contexts and rely on interpretations by default. Thus,
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reporting is best seen as an active enterprise in which reporters take
advantage of the audience’s background knowledge and adapt to the fidelity
standards required in the reporting context. As I wrote above, utterers of
homophonic reports do not simply repeat an utterance – they choose to
repeat rather than to paraphrase.23
Department of Philosophy I
University of Granada
NOTES
1 I take this expression from Recanati (2006).
2 Refer to Recanati (2004) for a presentation of the main claims of contextualism. We can
distinguish two versions of contextualism. According to moderate contextualism, what is said is
often the result of modulation. According to radical contextualism, conventional meaning is not
truth-conditional, and as a result, modulation is a mandatory process.
3 Refer to Sperber and Wilson (1995), Carston (2002), Recanati (2004), and Travis (2008).
4 Later, I argue that identity between intended and recovered proposition is not necessary
for communication. My point here is that, usually, conventional meaning is insufficient.
5 Refer to Cappelen and Lepore (2005), and to Wieland (2010a) and Begby (2013) for
criticisms.
6 Refer to, for example, DeRose (1992).
7 In Section 5, I argue that an impoverished version of the intended proposition might be
good enough.
8 Perry (1986) is the locus classicus. I will not discuss herewhether this is an instance ofmod-
ulation or of an unarticulated constituent. The repetition problem arises anyway.
9 I follow here Bach (2005).
10 Interpretations by default are a variety of what Bach (1995) calls ‘standardization’.
11 Cappelen andLepore (2007) hold that we have no way of predicting themodulatedmean-
ing of an utterance (development of logical form, inRelevanceTheory’s terminology).Here I am
arguing that the opposite is often the case. Using our knowledge of stereotypical conversations,
we can predict the modulation of many sentences.
12 The situation is radically different from Wieland’s Secret Spy Context (Wieland 2010b).
In order to argue that our reporting practices are not reducible to phonetic duplication,Wieland
imagines an example in which a reporter passes the message ‘Anne said that the apple is red’
from a spy to a non-co-situated spy. The role of the reporter in Wieland’s example is passive.
13 Refer to Wedgwood (2007) for a similar point on fallibility and reliability.
14 I take the example from Travis (1997).
15 Borg (2016) uses a similar argument in order to cast doubts on the claim that speakers di-
rectly intend to communicate pragmatically adjusted contents. Although I agree with her that
speakers need not have a very definite content in mind, I think that very often our communica-
tive intentions go beyond conventional meaning. I explore the claim that communicative inten-
tions are unspecific in Picazo (2019) and Picazo (forthcoming).
16 Refer to Bezuidenhout (1997) and Carston (2002).
17 Negation reverses the relation. The proposition that the leaves are not green (in some sense
or other) entails that the leaves are not naturally green, and so on.
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18 A natural question now is as follows: what about other cases of pragmatic adjustment,
such as loosening, or the complex phenomena that contextualists have paid attention to, such
as multi-dimensional adjectives? Exploring the suitable relations between the intended and the
recovered propositions in these other cases goes beyond the scope of this paper. Let me just note
that the relations can be varied and different for each phenomenon.Nonetheless, it is plausible to
think that the basic ideas presented for enrichmentwill hold for other phenomena: interpretation
will also be gradual, some suitable relation between intended and recovered proposition will be
required, and communicative success in cases of impoverished content will depend on goals. The
suitable relation, however, might not be explainable in terms of nested propositions.
19 Noting that the interpreter sometimes recovers a proposition that is not identical to the
one intended by the speaker, relevance theorists have put forward views of communication
based on the similarity (not identity) between intended and retrieved proposition. However, it
has been argued that similarity views are problematic for several reasons. Refer to Cappelen
and Lepore (2007).
20 Thus, the proposal is compatible with Cappelen and Lepore’s (2005) Speech Act
Pluralism. Pluripropositionalism can also be developed along the lines of Perry (2001), Korta
and Perry (2007, 2011), and Corazza (2012). Following these authors, propositions can be
understood as abstract objects that are used for classificatory purposes. Instead of a unique
and definite proposition, we can attribute different contents to an utterance, depending on
whether we focus on the speaker or the interpreter.
21 Capturing one of the propositions expressed might not be sufficient. As mentioned in
Section 2, because of the differences between reporting and reported context, some reports attri-
bute a different proposition to the speaker – for instance, that the apple is superficially red instead
of that the apple is red in the inside. Nonetheless, these reports can be said to also convey themin-
imal proposition, and so in a sense they express one of the propositions expressed by the reported
utterance. The second condition is needed in order to rule out these cases.
22 According to Recanati’s (2004) availability principle, what is said with a use of a sentence
crucially depends on what is available to competent interpreters.
23 I have presented earlier versions of this paper at the 10th European Congress of Analytic
Philosophy and the University of Granada, Department of Philosophy I. I am very grateful to
the participants for their helpful feedback. Thanks also to Laura Delgado, Eduardo Pérez
Navarro, and an anonymous referee for their comments. Financial support was received from
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (Government of Spain) and European Union (grant
PID2019-105728GB-I00; MINECO/FEDER, EU).
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